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PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Volume 11 Spring 1994 Number 2
Potential Legal Standards for Resolving
the R.S. 2477 Right of Way Crisis
HARRY R. BADER*
An obscure 1866 Federal law, Revised Statute 2477,
granted rights of way for construction of highways over
public lands to miners, farmers, ranchers and homestead-
ers to assist them in developing the West. Although the act
was repealed over sixteen years ago, controversies still arise
today. This article seeks to understand the R.S. 2477grant,
and proposed a workable rule of law to govern its progeny.
The right-of-way for the construction of highways over pub-
lic lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.'
I. Introduction
The development of America's highways and secondary
road systems have, in many ways, paralleled the expansion
* Professor of Natural Resources Law, School of Agriculture and Land Re-
sources Management, University of Alaska-Fairbanks; B.A. Washington State
University, 1985; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1988. I thank for their excellent
work the editorial team at Pace Environmental Law Review. Without their ad-
ditional research, editing and criticism, this article could not have been pub-
lished. Their's was a contribution more akin to co-authorship than that of
editing.
1. An Act granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the
Public Lands, and for other Purposes § 8, 14 Stat. 253 (1866) (hereinafter Re-
vised Statute 2477 or R.S. 2477), repealed by Federal Land Policy Management
Act of 1976 § 706(a), Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744, 2793.
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and growth of the republic over the last 200 years. An una-
voidable consequence of the western migration was large
scale trespass on federal lands.2 In recognition of that fact,
and in an effort to codify a system for future access, the 1866
Congress passed Revised Statute 2477 to legitimize the paths
and roads made by America's frontiersman and permit the
states the discretion to develop those paths and roads as they
saw fit. R.S. 2477, passed as part of the mining laws of 1866, 3
was repealed in 1976. However, it still poses a significant
threat to much of the nation's important land conservation
legislation.
Despite its repeal, R.S. 2477 has the potential to thwart
effective management of much of the country's national park-
lands, designated wilderness areas, and wildlife refuges.4
Such potential protective measures as the California Desert
Conservation Act 5 may be jeopardized by this statute. De-
spite its deceptively simple language, it invokes the imbroglio
between state sovereignty and federal supremacy which has
plagued American federalism since the founding of the
Republic.
Though there is no legislative history on the statute's in-
tent,6 it is commonly understood that R.S. 2477 was an offer
2. Central Pac. Ry. v. Alameda County, 284 U.S. 463, 469-72 (1931).
3. An Act granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the
Public Lands, and for other Purposes, 14 Stat. 251 (1866).
4. See Celia Hunter, Guest Opinion, FAmBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER, Feb.
27, 1992, at 4:
Historic trails should be an asset, but these days, they are being
turned into weapons designed to destroy wilderness . .. [across]
public lands and conservation units .... The intent of Lt. Gov.
Coghill in pushing adoption of the proposed RS 2477 route designa-
tion regulations is to spark just such a proliferation of roads of
every type across the Alaska landscape.
Id. Alaska, where the assertions are most vigorous, contains 75% of America's
total national park system acreage, 90% of the total area within the wildlife
refuge system, and approximately 70% of all federal lands classified as
wilderness.
5. Concern over impacts of R.S. 2477 right-of-ways has recently motivated
Congress to instruct the U.S. Bureau of Land Management to issue a special
report on the matter. Public Land News 17(24):5 (Dec. 10, 1992).
6. Leroy K Latta, Public Access over Alaska Public Lands as Granted by
Section 8 of the Lode Mining Act of 1866, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 811, 818
(1988). See also Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1080 (10th Cir. 1988).
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from the federal government to the individual states and ter-
ritories to legitimize existent miners' and homesteaders' ac-
cess routes that had developed across the public domain
during the expansion of the western frontier. In so doing,
R.S. 2477 provided for the continued establishment of roads
that would foster future resource development across the vast
expanse of western lands owned by the federal government.7
While the motivation behind R.S. 2477 was discernible,
the statute's application was inhibited by its lack of guide-
lines. For example, R.S. 2477 contained no criteria for deter-
mining when the federal offer had been accepted or for
determining the scope of the granted easement once ac-
cepted.8 As a consequence of this uncertainty, Congress re-
pealed the grant 110 years later and replaced it with a more
formalistic system of permits through provisions contained in
the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (hereinafter
FLPMA). 9 However, Congress did provide that all accepted
rights of way existing at the time of R.S. 2477's repeal would
remain valid and be respected. 10
The problem today for federal lands managers and state
planners is the uncertainty regarding which rights of way
were accepted prior to the repeal of R.S. 2477 and what limits
were placed on those accepted. R.S. 2477 contained no clear
mechanism for notifying the federal government of right of
7. United States v. Gates of the Mountains Lake Shore Homes, Inc., 732
F.2d 1411, 1413 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984); Humboldt County v. United States, 684
F.2d 1276, 1282 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982). See contra United States v. Dunn, 478 F.2d
443, 445 (9th Cir. 1973). The Dunn court, in a lengthy footnote, asserted that
RS. 2477 was "not intended to grant rights, but instead to give legitimacy to
existing status otherwise indefensible." Id. at 445 n.2. However, the court
failed to address the body of state adjudications applying the provision prospec-
tively for nearly 100 years with federal acquiescence and, indeed, reliance. See
id. at 445-46.
8. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1080 (10th Cir. 1988); United
States v. 9,947.71 Acres of Land, 220 F. Supp. 328, 335 (D. Nev. 1963); Hatch v.
Black, 165 P. 518, 519 (Wyo. 1917).
9. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1769, 1764; 43 C.F.R. § 2801. See also Sierra Club, 848
F.2d at 1078-83. In Alaska, Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
§§ 1110(a)-(b), 1111, 1323. See also Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist,
The Alaska Lands Act's Innovations in the Law of Access Across Federal Lands,
4 ALAsKA L. REV. 1-35 (1987).
10. Id.
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way acceptance. Additionally, many of the R.S. 2477 rights of
way have been forgotten by the state and federal government,
but never formally abandoned or terminated by either
sovereign.
Clearly, resolution of this R.S. 2477 dilemma is of the ut-
most importance. When Congress passed most of its salient
land conservation statutes, it ignored R.S. 2477's lasting im-
pact on rights of way throughout the country. Until there is a
resolution of the state-federal conflicts, 1' the ability of the
federal government to promulgate and implement land man-
agement plans mandated by Congress1 2 will be stymied. Sec-
ond, until the issues provoked by R.S. 2477 are resolved,
innumerable land titles in affected states remain unclear,
and economic development in the western states will be
inhibited. 13
This article seeks to understand the R.S. 2477 grant, and
propose a workable rule of law to govern its progeny. 14 Part
II will set the historical context. Part III will introduce the
reader to the statute and its application. Part IV will propose
model rules to reconcile the conflict between state and federal
interests now existing in R.S. 2477 disputes. Because Alaska
is currently asserting its R.S. 2477 interests, this article shall
use Alaska and its case law as a model of the present R.S.
2477 situation. Similarly, this article will also discuss cases
in California, Nevada, and Idaho because of the large areas of
public land situated within those states. 15
11. This conflict centers around state's relying on their own statutes while
the federal government has been making inroads against each state's control.
See discussion infra parts III.C, III.D.
12. Pub. L. No. 96-487 § 304(g), 94 Stat. 2394-95 (1980); 16 U.S.C. §§ la-1
to la-8 (1988); 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1988).
13. Latta, supra note 6, at 813.
14. Solving the legal issues surrounding R.S. 2477 will serve as illuminat-
ing precedent for other state-federal controversies in the natural resources
field. Some of these include management of navigable streambeds and
waterbodies.
15. The percentage of each state's total area that is under federal owner-
ship (BLM, NPS, FWS, NFS, DOD, etc.) is as follows: Nevada-82%, Idaho-
63%, Alaska-68%, California-61%. See GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL
PuBLIc LAND AND REsOURCE LAw 14 (3d ed. 1992).
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II. Historical Context
The quest for understanding the R.S. 2477 grant and for
developing a workable rule to govern its progeny must start
with the story of the American West. America's undeveloped
frontier was disappearing as settlers spread westward from
the Missouri River and eastward from the Pacific coast. The
Federal Government, knowing that its vast western holdings
contained untold riches, and knowing equally it could not ad-
equately administer those holdings, turned to a series of "self-
help" remedies, of which R.S. 2477 is only one.
While the federal government was preoccupied with the
issues of slavery and secession in the years preceding the
mining laws, homesteaders and miners were left to their own
devices in developing access to claims and farms. Not until
after the Civil War did Congress once again turn its attention
to the nation's internal economic development. Recognizing
path and road developments that had already evolved in the
remote territories, Congress decided to formalize and solidify
these access routes, thereby validating the frontier policy of
self-help development. 16
These roads were necessary instruments in the settle-
ment of the United States.17 One justice, when discussing
the R.S. 2477 grant romantically commented:
one need but to raise their eyes, when traveling through
the West to see the innumerable roads and trails that lead
off, and on, through public domain, into the wilderness
where some prospector has found a stake (or broke his
heart) or a homesteader has found the valley of his dreams
If the builders of such roads to property surrounded by
the public domain had only a right thereto revocable at the
will of the (federal) government . . . . then the rights
granted for development and settlement of the public do-
main, whether for mining, homesteading, townsites, mill
16. 9,947.71 Acres of Land, 220 F. Supp. at 331.
17. Central Pac. Ry. v. Alameda County, 284 U.S. 463, 473 (1931); Wilken-
son v. Department of Interior, 634 F. Supp. 1265, 1275 (D. Colo. 1986).
1994]
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sites, lumbering or other uses, would have been a delusion
and a cruel and empty vision .... 18
The effects of this attitude are still felt today.
III. The R.S. 2477 Grant
The grant language of the R.S. 2477 right of way has con-
sistently been construed by the federal courts as an offer to
the public of a right of way across public lands not reserved
for public uses. 19 This section will define public lands not re-
served for public uses and will outline the current law of ac-
ceptance and scope of the accepted grant.
A. Defining Public Lands
Public lands are those owned by the federal government
and subject to sale or other disposal under the general land
laws, excluding those which any claims or rights of others
have attached.20 An R.S. 2477 right of way cannot be estab-
lished on public lands subject to any prior valid claim in
which the rights of the general public have passed. Thus, the
date of entry, not the date of actual patent,21 removes lands
from the public domain for purposes of establishing public
highways under the grant.
In addition to removing lands from potential R.S. 2477
designation through disposal, the federal government could
unilaterally withdraw lands by placing them into reserve sta-
tus, such as in national parks, monuments, wildlife refuges or
forests via Congressional statute or executive order.22 Unless
the land upon which an R.S. 2477 right of way is designated
18. 9,947,71 Acres of Land, 220 F. Supp. at 331.
19. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1078 (10th Cir. 1988).
20. Humboldt County v. United States, 684 F.2d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1982).
This definition of public lands is necessarily limited to lands which were or are
federally owned at the time relevant to acceptance of rights-of-way. Ball v. Ste-
phens, 158 P.2d 207, 209 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945).
21. A land patent is defined as "[a]n instrument conveying a grant of public
land; also, the land so conveyed." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 879 (6th ed. 1990).
22. Humboldt, 684 F.2d at 1281. See also BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND ORDERS 4582, 5189, 5418.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/1
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is public land when the offer is accepted, the state cannot
have acquired any right under the grant.23
Therefore, a state cannot acquire a R.S. 2477 right of way
interest for a public road across public lands after such lands
have been reserved for public uses. Conversely, a state's in-
terest in the right of way, after acceptance, cannot be extin-
guished simply because the public lands through which it
passes have been subsequently reserved. 24 In managing re-
served lands which have been carved from the public domain,
as occurred in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conserva-
tion Act,25 the operative question becomes: "Was an R.S.
2477 right-of-way through public lands accepted prior to the
reservation?"
B. Defining Acceptance
Acceptance of the R.S. 2477 grant offer is determined by
state law. Acceptance can be manifested by either (1) a for-
mal, official positive act on the part of a state (territorial) gov-
ernment, or (2) sufficient use on the part of the general
public, without any official recognition. 26
1. Express Acceptance
Official state action accepting the offered grant (such as
through formal declaration) is a relatively simple and
straight-forward matter. Some states assert that state legis-
lation which accepts Right's of way on section lines across un-
surveyed land is valid and express acceptance.27 This
position is contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Cox v.
Hart that only actual survey can create a section line, and
23. See Humboldt, 684 F.2d 1281.
24. Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 231 (1925).
25. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1988).
26. See, e.g., Shultz v. Department of Army, 10 F.3d 649, 655 (9th Cir.
1993). Arizona does not recognize acceptance by public use; only official, formal
action accepts the R.S. 2477 offer. See Tucson Consol. Copper Co. v. Reese, 100
P. 777, 778 (Ariz. 1909) (finding that public roads must be established by stat-
ute); Rodgers v. Ray, 457 P.2d 281, 283 (Ariz. 1969) (finding it doubtful that a
public road could be established by mere use).
27. Faxon v. Lallie Civil Township, 163 N.W. 531, 533 (N.D. 1917).
1994]
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this position does not stand up in court.28 The latter position
is the more prevalent.29
2. Acceptance Through "Sufficient Public Use"
While determining whether a grant has been expressly
accepted is relatively straightforward, attempting to deter-
mine valid acceptances through sufficient public use is a diffi-
cult and intricate matter.
Under R.S. 2477, each state must look to its statutory
and common law to formulate a criteria for determining ac-
ceptance by public use. 30 The lack of available sources cou-
pled with varying fact patterns from individually adjudicated
cases has prevented the evolution of precise principles. As a
result, R.S. 2477's intent of protecting validly-held, invest-
ment-backed expectations and of creating a systematic
method of access and road development has been impeded.
Exacerbating this legal limbo is the fact that as each state
attempts to create its own rules, interstate routes are
disrupted.
As eluded to earlier, different courts have varied as to
what factors are important in determining sufficient public
use. Some courts have focused on the length of time that the
public has used the route, finding that public use of a route
must exist for at least the amount of time required to estab-
28. Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 435 (1922). It is the position of this article
that section line easement designations are valid acceptances of the R.S. 2477
grant only when the actual survey has been conducted and marked the relevant
section line. If this is done, the acceptance is valid as of the date of survey. The
position by some Alaskan lawyers that Fisher v. Golden Valley Electric Associa-
tion, 658 P.2d 127 (Ala. 1983), stands for the validity of section line easements
relating back to time of survey is misplaced because it deals with lands owned
by the state after being acquired from the federal government. Thus, the case is
irrelevant to the debate of section line easements declared by states as accept-
ances of the grant on federal lands.
29. Wallowa County v. Wade 72 P. 793, 794 (Or. 1903).
30. Shultz, 10 F.3d at 656; Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1079 (10th
Cir. 1988). See Rippley, Highway Rights-of-Way on Public Lands, 9 TRANsP.
L.J. 121 (1977). "Whether a right of way has been established is a question of
state law."
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/1
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lish prescriptive rights.31 This theory, however, has been re-
jected by a majority of the courts.32 This is because
prescription implies an adverse user, while use under R.S.
2477 occurs with the government's consent and even encour-
agement.33 While the length of time that the public uses the
route may not be dispositive, it is often a "material ingredi-
ent" in any determination.3 4
Another factor courts have considered in determining
whether there has been sufficient public use is the character
of the use. Some courts, along with the Department of the
Interior, have interpreted the grant as requiring that the
character of use include construction of a highway to consti-
tute sufficient public use. 35 In one jurisdiction, however, this
position has been recently rejected. A Colorado district court
held that mere use by the public can be sufficient.
36
The original purpose of R.S. 2477 was to assure access to
private development, facilitate communication among them,
induce others to follow and create additional development,
and eventually lead to permanent settlements with stable
economies. R.S. 2477, however, cannot be thought of as only
seeking guarantees of access to individuals and small groups:
31. Vogler v. Anderson, 89 P. 551 (Wash. 1907); City of Butte v. Mikosowitz,
102 P. 593 (Mont. 1909).
32. Berger v. OhIson, 9 Alaska 389, 395 (1938); see also Lovelace v. Hight-
ower, 168 P.2d 864, 871, 872 (N.M. 1946); Hatch Bros. v. Black, 165 P. 518, 519
(Wyo. 1917); Quintana v. Knowles, 851 P.2d 482 (N.M. 1993); Hughes v. Veal,
114 P. 1081 (Kan. 1911); Schwertdle v. County of Placer, 41 P. 448 (Cal. 1895);
Okanogan County v. Cheetham, 80 P. 262 (Wash. 1905); Murray v. City of
Butte, 14 P. 656 (Mont. 1887); Doyle v. Chattanooga, 161 S.W. 997 (Tenn.
1913); Riley v. Buchanan, 76 S.W. 527 (Ky. Ct. App. 1903).
33. Hatch Bros., 165 P. at 520.
34. Harding v. Jasper, 14 Cal. 642, 647-48 (Cal. 1860).
35. Rogers v. Ray, 457 P.2d 281, 283 (Ariz. 1969); Bureau of Land Manage-
ment Manual, § 2801 (B)(1); see also Humboldt County v. United States, 684
F.2d at 1281 n.5.
36. Wilkenson v. Department of Interior, 634 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Colo. 1986).
See also Leach v. Manhart, 77 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1938); Hamerly v. Denton, 359
P.2d 121 (Alaska 1961); Roper v. Elkhorn at Sun Valley, 605 P.2d 968 (Idaho
1980); Anderson v. Richards, 608 P.2d 1096 (Nev. 1980); Hatch Bros., 165 P.
518,; Wilson v. Williams, 87 P.2d 683 (N.M. 1939).
The Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) has also rejected the Depart-
ment of Interior's interpretation and generally follows the state law where the
right-of-way is located. See Latta, supra note 6, at 824-28.
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other statutory provisions already assured those rights.37
Congress clearly envisioned R.S. 2477 as assisting the evolu-
tion of the West as a whole. By promoting the use of individ-
ual trails across government lands by the public, Congress
hoped to promote settlement of the region by means of effi-
cient natural selection. Only those routes valuable enough
and strategically located to induce public travel would be
used enough to be considered accepted rights of way. Thus,
public use begetting public acceptance. 38
C. Defining the Scope of the Right of Way
Once a right of way has been accepted, considerable de-
bate follows concerning the scope of the easement. Again, the
statute is silent regarding the application of state or federal
law in determining the scope of interests represented in the
easement, 39 and legislative history regarding R.S. 2477 is al-
most non-existent. 40 In attempting to reconcile conflicting
views of which privileges the right of way grants a state, at
least one federal circuit has said that "[a]ny doubt as to the
scope of the [easement] must be resolved in favor of the (fed-
eral) government."41
In United States v. Oregon and California Railroad,42
the Supreme Court stated that the scope of a grant of federal
land is a question of federal law. However, in some instances,
"it may be determined as a matter of federal law that the
United States has impliedly adopted and assented to a state
rule of construction as applicable to its conveyances." 43
37. See A.T. Biddle, Access Rights Over Public Lands Granted by the 1866
Mining Law and Recent Regulations, 18 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 415 (1973).
38. State ex rel. Dansie v. Nolan, 191 P. 150, 153 (Mont. 1920).
39. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1080 (10th Cir. 1988).
40. See Latta, supra note 6, at 818.
41. United States v. Gates of the Mountains Lakeshore Homes, Inc., 732
F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Humboldt County v. United States, 684
F.2d 1276, 1280-81 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Schultz v. Department of the
Army, 10 F.3d 649, 655 (9th Cir. 1993) (reaffirming Humboldt).
42. 164 U.S. 526 (1896).
43. United States v. Oregon, 195 U.S. 1, 28 (1935). But see, Marden Corp. v.
C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). The Marden Corp. court,
determining whether a private agreement regarding contribution rights for
clean up costs barred a CERCLA § 107(a) suit to recover, found that "[cilearly
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/1
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States argue that because R.S. 2477 is silent as to what law
to apply, it implies that state law is to be used.
Where competing federal and state interests are in-
volved, most cases follow United States v. Union Pacific Rail-
road,44 which held that federal law controls. The Court
reached this conclusion when Union Pacific claimed rights to
oil and gas deposits underlying their granted right of way.45
The leading case on the scope of the R.S. 2477 grant is
Sierra Club v. Hodel.46 The Tenth Circuit used a test enunci-
ated in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,47 to determine
whether state or federal law should delimit the scope of the
R.S. 2477 grant. Under the analysis of Wilson v. Omaha In-
dian Tribe, the choice of federal or state law depends on three
factors:
"whether there is need for a nationally uniform body of
law to apply in situations comparable to this, whether ap-
plication of state law would frustrate federal policy or func-
tions, and the impact a federal rule might have on existing
relationships under state law."48
The Tenth Circuit rejected Sierra Club's claim that the
R.S. 2477 framework favored federal law over state law.49 In
addressing the first factor the court ruled that although
FLPMA "admittedly embodies a congressional intent to cen-
tralize and systematize the management of public lands," the
policies which support FLPMA are "simply not relevant to
R.S. 2477's construction."50 The need for uniformity should
not be assessed in terms of the goals and policies of a statute
the fact that federal law governs does not always mean that federal courts
should fashion a uniform federal rule, even if the question involves the scope of
a federal statutory right. . . ." Id. at 1457. However, even if the federal court
determines that state law should be incorporated, the court may reject those
state rules antithetical to federal interests. Id. at 1458.
44. 353 U.S. 112 (1957).
45. Id. at 120.
46. 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
47. 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
48. Id. at 672-73.
49. Sierra Club, 848 F.2d at 1083.
50. Id. at 1082.
1994] 495
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created 110 years after R.S. 2477, but should "be assessed in
terms of Congress' intent at the time of passage [of R.S.
24771."51
Finding that the second Wilson factor also favored the
states, the Tenth Circuit concluded that, because R.S. 2477
grants have been defined by state law since the statute's in-
ception, the creation of a "new federal standard would neces-
sitate the remeasurement and reemarcation of thousands of
R.S. 2477 rights-of-way across the country. . ." which would
result in "an administrative duststorm that would choke
BLM's ability to manage the public lands."52
Under the third Wilson factor, the Tenth Circuit found
that since the inception of R.S. 2477 grants, states have "de-
veloped [their] own state-based definition of the perfection or
scope.. .either by explicitly declaring R.S.2477 to incorporate
state law or by simply expounding [their] own law."53 The
court was not "aware of any state that even considered the
possibility of a federal rule."54 Thus, the court concluded
that, "[a] change to a federal standard would adversely affect
existing property relationships..." and "disturb the expecta-
tions of all parties to these property relationships."55 The re-
sult of this ruling was that the scope of the right of way in
question was determined by Utah state law, which defined
the width of a R.S. 2477 as "that which is reasonable and nec-
essary for the type of use to which the road has been put."56
In determining what is "reasonable and necessary" the
Sierra Club court stated that the rights of way are subject to
the principles that govern the scope of easements. 57 The
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1083.
56. Id., (citing Lindsay Land and Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646, 649
(Utah 1929)). Although the Sierra Club court applied the "reasonable and nec-
essary" standard, implicit in its holding is that the court will apply the stan-
dard from the state in which the right of way is asserted. Thus, if the case
originated in a different state, the Tenth Circuit would have applied that state's
standard.
57. Sierra Club, 848 F.2d at 1083 (citing J. Cribbett, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY 273-74 (1962)).
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/1
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scope is not limited to that to which the road was being put
when it first became an R.S. 2477 road. Every use to which
the road was put before the repeal of R.S. 2477 in 1976 is
"automatically vested as an incident of the easement."58 Un-
less there is evidence that there was termination or surren-
der of the easement, the right of way as of the date of repeal,
is that which is "reasonable and necessary" for the right of
way's preexisting uses.59 The initial use of the trail at issue
in Sierra Club was for driving livestock, oil, water and min-
eral developments, transportation by county residents and
sine 1973 tourists.60 Therefore, the scope was determined to
be "that which is reasonable and'necessary to ensure safe
travel for the uses above-mentioned, including improving the
road to two lanes so travelers could pass each other."61
The Wilson factors comport with the Supreme Court's
ruling in Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products.62 The
Supreme Court stated in Andrus that "[t]he Government
must prevail when the relevant statutory provisions, their
historical context, consistent administrative and judicial de-
cisions, and the practical problems with a contrary holding
all weigh in its favor."63 Because the Court states that there
are situations when state law shall apply, it strengthens the
Tenth Circuit decision which uses the Wilson test, because
the Wilson test does seem to comport with the exceptions that
were noted by the Supreme Court in Andrus.
The issue in Andrus concerned whether water is a "valu-
able mineral" within the meaning of 30 U.S.C. section 22, and
hence is a locatable mineral thereunder. 64 The Supreme
58. Id. at 1084.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Other cases which used the "reasonable and necessary" test include:
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646 (Utah 1930) (finding it
'proper and necessary for the [lower] court in defining the road to determine its
width, and to fix the same according to what was reasonable and necessary,
under all the facts and circumstances for the uses which were made of the
road"); Montgomery v. Somers, 90 P. 674 (Or. 1907); Bishop v. Hawley, 238 P.
284 (Wyo. 1925); Whitesides v. Green, 44 P. 1032 (Utah 1896).
62. 436 U.S. 604 (1978).
63. Id. at 616.
64. Id. at 605.
1994] 497
13
498 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.11
Court held that water is not a "valuable mineral" within the
meaning of the statute because it was not the type of valuable
mineral that the 1872 Congress intended to make the basis of
a valid claim.65 In its conclusion, the Supreme Court stated
that it has long been established that, when grants to federal
land are at issue, any doubts "are resolved for the Govern-
ment, not against it."66
D. Property Clause Limitations on the Scope of an R.S.
2477 Rights of Way
The property clause ensures that the power over federal
public lands is entrusted to Congress.67 As a result, federal
agencies have the ability to protect federal lands against in-
terference with their intended uses. 68 Conduct which signifi-
cantly detracts from the purposes for which the federal lands
are managed may be restricted or forbidden, even when the
conduct occurs on neighboring private or state property.69 A
different rule would place the management of federal land at
the mercy of state law.7 0 Federal resort to the property
clause, though rare, has proved potent.
There is a paucity of case law regarding the use of the
property clause in R.S. 2477 disputes. However, reflection on
four important property clause cases may assist in the formu-
lation of a clear, concise, and workable rule for guiding deci-
sions when competing sovereign interests clash.
The first significant restriction upon private conduct oc-
curring on lands outside federal territory took place in Vir-
ginia. 71 There, pursuant to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,72
the Back Bay Waterfowl Refuge was authorized by the De-
65. Id. at 614.
66. Id. at 617 (citing United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 353 U.S. 112,
116 (1957)).
67. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-41 (1976).
68. Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
69. Id.
70. Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1083-84 (9th Cir.
1980); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897).
71. Bailey v. Holland, 126 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1942).
72. 16 U.S.C. §§ 701-711 (1988).
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partment of Interior. The purpose of the refuge was to offer
the sanctuary as a feeding and resting area for the Atlantic
Flyway's beleaguered denizens. Protection, offered by the
refuge was designed to restore waterfowl populations whose
numbers had plummeted during a century of mismanage-
ment before the efforts of Leopold and others had trans-
formed wildlife managers into professional scientists.
The remarkable, though not yet completely understood
migratory urges which brought the birds to Back Bay, also
brought them low over vantage points owned by a private
hunting club. Just outside the refuge boundary,
clubmembers shot the waterfowl with alacrity. The dispro-
portionate success enjoyed by these hunters, due to their
strategic positions, threatened to undermine the entire pur-
pose for the refuge. Consequently, the federal government
promulgated regulations that banned all waterfowl hunting
on 5,000 acres of surrounding state and private land, includ-
ing the land owned by the hunting club. Fearing economic
ruin, the owner filed suit, seeking to invalidate the regula-
tions' reach beyond federal land.
Holding in favor of the federal government, the court
ruled that even though the United States claimed no title to
the lands subject to the new regulation, the ban was obvi-
ously necessary to effectuate the conservation program envi-
sioned, and therefore the regulations were not confined to the
lands under federal ownership. 73 In order to achieve the fed-
eral purpose, the government had the power to prohibit all
hunting within the immediate vicinity of the refuge. 74
A similar case, forty years later, made more explicit use
of the property and supremacy clauses. 75 In Minnesota's
north country is a labyrinth of lakes and streams that create
one of America's premier canoeing areas. Congress, recogniz-
ing the need to preserve the area's recreational potential, re-
served much of the federal land for a wilderness area and a
national park. In addition, regulations were promulgated
73. Bailey, 126 F.2d at 322.
74. Id. at 324.
75. United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977).
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that prohibit hunting on waters inside the Voyegeurs Na-
tional Park.
A duck hunter, in full compliance with state law, began
hunting from a boat on Rainey Lake, a navigable water body
completely surrounded by the national park. The hunter was
in full compliance with all relevant state and federal hunting
laws for the harvesting of waterfowl on a state lake. Because
the lake was navigable, the hunter argued that it remained
within state, and not federal territory. The case began when
national park rangers, consistent with park regulations, ar-
rested the hunter.
The court agreed with the hunter that the lake remained
within state territory. The state, according to the court, had
never relinquished its sovereignty over the lake to the federal
government when the national park was created. However,
the court ruled in favor of the National Park Service regula-
tions that prohibit hunting on the lake because the ban was a
constitutional exercise of congressional power under the
property clause. 76 The court decided that "when regulation is
for the protection of federal property, the property clause is
broad enough to reach beyond territorial limits." 77 Because
the federal regulations were deemed "necessary" to protect
wildlife and visitors in the national park, the court reasoned
that to allow hunting would significantly interfere with in-
tended purposes for which the park was established.7 8
A third property clause case, Minnesota v. Block, 79 also
upheld the validity of federal regulations restricting private
activity on lands within state jurisdiction and outside federal
territory. Again, this case arose from issues in northern Min-
nesota's watery wilderness. In 1978, Congress altered the
management of the 1,000,000 acre Boundary Waters Wilder-
ness Canoe area in the Superior National Forest by severely
restricting the use of motorized boats and snow machines in
order to preserve the sense of wilderness. The ban extended
76. Id. at 822.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1007 (1982).
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beyond the territorial limits of the designated wilderness
area and applied to 120,000 acres of neighboring state and
private lands. The state of Minnesota and private land own-
ers, fearing the effect of the regulation upon the important
local tourist economy filed suit.
In its opinion, the court once again found that under the
authority of the property clause, Congressional power ex-
tends to the regulation of conduct both on and off federal
lands if that conduct threatens the purposes for which the
government is managing its lands.80 The court upheld the
regulation as needful, concluding that motorized vehicles
could significantly interfere with the wilderness values of the
area.81
The first case that clearly demonstrated the property
clause's impact on Rights of Way 2477 was United States v.
Vogler.8 2 Joe Vogler, a Fairbanks miner and Alaskan Inde-
pendence Party founder, drove his D-8 Caterpillar tractor
along the Bielenberg Trail into Yukon-Charley Rivers Na-
tional Preserve in the remote east-central region of Alaska.
Vogler chose to drive his machinery into the preserve during
the summer, without applying for a permit, instead of using
the trail in winter, its traditional season of use. Park Service
policy was to reject summer use of the trail because of the
extreme environmental damage caused by the heavy vehicles
to the tundra and spruce bog. Routinely, however, the Park
Service granted winter permits when snow and the frozen
ground minimized ecological harm.
Based upon their protective regulations, Park rangers
forcibly stopped Mr. Vogler as he entered the preserve. Vo-
gler asserted in court that the state, not the federal govern-
ment had sole authority to regulate use and scope of valid
R.S. 2477 easements.
Rejecting Vogler's arguments, the court ruled that even if
the Bielenberg Trail was an accepted right of way (which the
court ultimately declined to decide), it was within the power
80. Id. at 1248-49.
81. Id.
82. 859 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988).
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of the Park Service, under the property clause, to control the
easement. Relying on Wilkenson v. Department of Interior,3
the court held:
Even if we assume that the trail is an established right-of-
way, we do not accept Vogler's argument that the govern-
ment is totally without authority to regulate the manner of
its use... [T]he property clause gives Congress the power
over public lands... The regulations here are necessary to
conserve the natural beauty of the preserve.8 4
The property clause, however, should not be interpreted as
vitiating all state interests in the management of R.S. 2477
rights of way.8 5 For even the tremendous authority granted
to the federal government under the powerful commerce
clause is not without limitation.8 6 Significant state interests
may permit state authority and activity, under the state po-
lice powers, even when state conduct may effect interstate
commerce, a field traditionally held to be exclusively
federal.8 7
IV. Analysis
A. Proposed Rule for Acceptance
Though the statute was silent as to whether federal law
or state law governs determinations of acceptance, custom
has dictated that state law governs.88 During the past dec-
ade, however, there have been sporadic federal initiatives as-
serting that federal regulation alone should determine
83. 634 F. Supp. 1265, 1279 (D. Colo. 1986).
84. Vogler, 859 F.2d at 641-42.
85. The Supreme Court does, however, use the Property Clause as an im-
plement of great power. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976).
86. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 310 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
87. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
88. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1078(10th Cir. 1988); Wilkenson v.
Department of Interior, 634 F. Supp. 1265, 1272 (D. Colo. 1986); United States
v. 9,947.71 Acres of Land, 220 F. Supp. 328, 335 (D. Nev. 1963); Girves v. Kenai
Peninsula Borough, 536 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Alaska 1975); Ball v. Stephens, 158
P.2d at 209; Kirk v. Schultz, 119 P.2d 266, 268 (Idaho 1941).
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whether acceptance has occurred.8 9 The federal attempts to
unilaterally control acceptance criteria should not prevail.
State law should continue to be the sole source for con-
trolling acceptance by formal official action, and federal
courts should amalgamate the laws of the various states into
a single uniform rule (which remains dedicated to the main-
tenance of state sovereignty over the police power interests
over health, safety and welfare), for construing acceptance
criteria by public use. In advocating the paramount role of
state law in the acceptance process, though, it must be ac-
knowledged that a state cannot "bootstrap" rights with legis-
lation passed after R.S. 2477's repeal in 1976.90 Thus, one
must look only to the standard of state law, as it existed be-
tween 1866 and 1976, during which time public lands re-
mained eligible for right of way grants.
The argument in favor of deference to state authority in
matters of grant acceptance is institutional in nature. Unless
some new problem unquestionably demonstrates that the
concept of state authority is no longer viable, the century old
rule of law should not be surrendered. To do otherwise would
wreak havoc to the foundations of federalism. If the federal
government possessed the ability to eliminate state jurisdic-
tion over such vital state interests as transportation, without
balancing the utility of the decision, the validity of the notion
of states as sovereign entities is no more than an illusion.
And if that be the case, then federalism is dead. The federal
government has not yet established that existing mecha-
nisms in the law for substantively balancing state and federal
interests are so unworkable in R.S. 2477 determinations that
state authority should be removed entirely from the field of
grant acceptance. Indeed, the opposite has been true.
89. See Letter from Frederick I. Ferguson, Deputy Solicitor, Office of the
Solicitor, United States Department of the Interior, to James W. Moorman, As-
sistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, Department of
Justice (Apr. 28, 1980) (on file with the Pace Environmental Law Review) [here-
inafter Solicitor Ferguson Letter]. See also Latta, supra note 6.
90. Sierra Club, 848 F.2d at 1083.
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In addition to recent federal court decisions upholding
the role of state law in acceptances, 91 the federal agency most
responsible for interpreting and implementing the grant, the
U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM), has also relied ex-
clusively upon state law. BLM has recognized for decades
that grants become effective upon the construction or estab-
lishment of highways in accordance with state law.9 2 Addi-
tionally, congressional silence throughout the 110 year period
between enactment and repeal of R.S. 2477 must be perceived
as legislative approval of the statute's implementation, at
least up until the date of repeal. 93 Furthermore, for over a
century territories and states have organized their social and
economic development in reliance on the idea that their state
law - not federal - determines the acceptance of potentially
valuable R.S. 2477 right of ways.
When Congress deliberately writes broad and vaguely
worded statutes as general policy pronouncements, it relies
upon the federal courts to "fine tune" and "fill in the blanks"
so that the statute may be appropriately applied to specific
circumstances. 94 Because the complete body of federal stat-
utes is not internally consistent when viewed in aggregate,
the federal courts must balance among any number of com-
peting public policies as they interpret legislation.95 Relying
upon common law principles, the canons of statutory con-
struction and the history of prior compromises in statutory
case law, the federal judiciary fashions a "common law of
statutes" from the legal analysis.96
91. See note 27 supra.
92. 43 C.F.R. § 244.55 (1939); 43 C.F.R. § 244.58 (1963); 43 C.F.R. § 2822.2
(1974).
93. See Central Pac. Ry. v. Alameda County, 284 U.S. 463 (1931); see also
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.
459, 472-73 (1915). "In the face of congressional silence, the interpretation of
the implementing agency will carry great weight. . . . [W]hen an agency has
followed a notorious, consistent, and long standing interpretation, it may be
presumed that Congress' silence denotes acquiescence." Sierra Club, 848 F.2d
at 1080.
94. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: NATURE, LAW, AND
SocIErY 259, 283, 299 (1992).
95. Id. at 283.
96. Id. at 259.
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The public highway law of 1866 is no longer serving the
interest it sought to promote. Therefore, with special defer-
ence to state court decisions already in existence, it is time for
the federal judiciary to articulate a uniform rule governing
public use acceptance.
What then, is the definition of public use? Public use
must be defined as the function of three factors: 1) the pur-
pose for which the public puts the route to use; 2) the types of
public user; and 3) the nature of the route itself.
These three factors, closely related, must be considered
in aggregate to determine if use by the public is sufficient to
constitute acceptance. Each factor has its own threshold, and
no one factor alone is sufficient to indicate acceptance. The
following description of these factors is intended to identify a
rational test for acceptance determinations, thereby bringing
order and predictability to the R.S. 2477 assertion process.
1. The Purpose for Which the Public Puts the Route
to Use
There are four possible uses of a route under the first cri-
terion. These are: (a) Commercial Uses, (b) Destinational
Uses, (c) Developmental Uses, and (d) Governmental Uses.
(a) Commercial Uses are those in which a particular route
regularly serves as a conduit in the stream of transporting
goods. Examples include routes for hauling freight from
public docks into town,97 and routes used for the transport
of livestock to and from grazing territory.98
(b) Destinational Uses occur when a route is used to con-
nect two or more distinct locations. Examples include
routes which are the primary means between towns99 or
which link two transportation arteries,100 or which once
served as stage lines.101 Random travel for hunting, trap-
97. Dillingham Commercial Co. v. City of Dillingham, 705 P.2d 410, 414
(Alaska 1985); Berger v. Ohlson, 9 Alaska 389, 392 (1938).
98. Montgomery v. Somers, 90 P. 674, 675 (Or. 1907).
99. Schwerdtle v. Placer County, 41 P. 448 (Cal. 1895).
100. Dillingham Commercial, 705 P.2d at 414.
101. Schwerdtle, 41 P. at 448.
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ping, and sightseeing does not constitute a destinational
use. 102
(c) Developmental uses occur when a variety of different
entrepreneurs use the same route to access a common re-
gion for development. Area examples include oil fields,
mineral districts, and ranchlands. 10 3
(d) Governmental uses occur when the government, state
or federal, regularly use a route to provide a public service,
such as for delivering the mail. 104
2. The Types of Public User
The second factor, the type of public using the route, is
closely related to the first factor. However, this criterion
looks at the number and variety of users over time. 10 5 The
point of this criterion is to demonstrate that the route is not
used primarily by only one or several individuals. Thus, this
factor distinguishes truly public roads from those that are es-
sentially "private" in character.'06
3. The Nature of the Route
The final factor to be considered in the "public accept-
ance" test is the nature of the route itself. This test looks to
factors which indicate attributes which would lead one to
view the route as a public highway. Factors include whether
the route is well-defined, 10 7 whether it is clearly confined to a
102. Hamerly v. Denton, 359 P.2d 121, 124-25 (Alaska 1961).
103. Ball v. Stephens, 158 P.2d 207, 210-11 (Cal. 1945); Montgomery v.
Somers, 90 P. 674, 676 (Or. 1907).
104. Schwerdtle, 41 P. at 448.
105. Lindsay Land and Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646 (Utah 1929).
For other examples of number and variety, see Ball v. Stephens, 158 P.2d 207
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945); Schwerdtle, 41 P. at 448; Dillingham Commercial,
705 P.2d at 410.
106. This criterion runs counter to much of the case law. See opposing views
in Rogge v. United States, 10 Alaska 130, 152 (1941); Leach v. Manhart, 77
P.2d 652, 653 (Colo. 1938); Wilkenson v. Department of Interior, 634 F. Supp.
1265, 1272 (D. Colo. 1986).
107. Clark v. Taylor, 9 Alaska 298, 313 (1938); Ball, 158 P.2d at 210; Leach,
77 P.2d at 653; Montgomery, 90 P. at 677.
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recognizable route,108 and whether there is evidence of con-
structed improvements and maintenance on the part of pri-
vate individuals or government. 10 9
If an asserted route meets the rigors of these three crite-
ria, then it should be considered a valid R.S. 2477 right of
way accepted through public use.
For over a century, territories and states have organized
their social and economic development in reliance on the idea
that their state law -not federal- determines the acceptance of
potentially valuable R.S. 2477 rights of way. There is not a
strong argument contrary to this long held belief. The extent
to which an accepted right of way may be developed and used
by the state is an entirely separate legal issue from the law of
acceptance. Mechanisms for fashioning new balancing tests
already exist within the Constitution's property and
supremacy clauses for resolving conflicts concerning right of
way scope after it has been accepted. Therefore, there is no
reason to change the source of authority addressing accept-
ances sufficient to violate the expectations that have vested
over a century of consistent implementation.
B. Proposed Rule for Scope
This article asserts that it would be far easier to recog-
nize the easement as possessing all the attributes of a normal
modern day highway right of way as statutorily driven in
each state than to try to measure the scope of the right of way
as a reflection of the use to which the route has traditionally
been put.1 0 To do otherwise would involve a difficult factual
inquiry coupled with an almost impossible task of extrapolat-
ing yesterday's frontier conception of highways to today's so-
cietal needs and technological realities.
108. Clark, 9 Alaska at 312; Hatch Bros. v. Black, 165 P. 518, 519 (Wyo.
1917).
109. Okanagon County v. Cheetham, 80 P. 262 (Wash. 1905); Kirk v.
Schultz, 119 P.2d 266 (Idaho 1941). See also Hatch Bros., 165 P. at 520; State
ex rel. Dansie v. Nolan, 191 P. 150, 152 (Mont. 1920); Schwerdtle, 41 P. at 448;
Leach, 77 P.2d at 653.
110. See Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1081 (10th Cir. 1988). See also
43 U.S.C. § 1769(a) (1988).
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Conflicts arising between the exercise of a state's full
easement rights and the federal government's right to protect
and use its lands, across which the right of way passes,
should be resolved under a balancing calculus construed from
the U.S. Constitution's Property Clause."' This is an en-
tirely different issue than determining the existence of a
valid easement under R.S. 2477.
Scope of right of way use becomes an issue when a state
or any other governmental unit or private individual at-
tempts to use an R.S. 2477 easement in a fashion perceived
as incompatible with the use for which the surrounding fed-
eral lands have been dedicated or for which the easement was
originally used.112 For obvious reasons, the problem is most
pronounced when the federal land, through which the route
passes, has been reserved from public domain status into na-
tional parks or some other conservation system unit, after the
route has been accepted as an R.S. 2477 easement. Potential
conflicts may arise when a state wishes to pave the route or
straighten it; or when private parties use is at such a time or
in a manner that is disruptive to federal lands management
goals. When such conflicts erupt, the U.S. Constitution's
property clause may serve as an appropriate guide. The task,
then, is one of fashioning an appropriate legal rule that will
strike the proper balance between legitimate state interests
in its easement and federal authority under the property
clause in R.S. 2477 use disputes.
1. Establish Presumptions
The first step is to establish presumptions. A logical
starting point would be to begin with the presumption that
federal regulatory restrictions on R.S. 2477 easements run-
ning across federal lands are valid exercises of federal au-
111. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
112. Scope has been defined as:
The 'scope' of a right of way refers to the bundle of property rights
possessed by the holder of the right of way. This bundle is defined
as the physical boundaries of the right-of-way as well as the uses to
which it has been put.
Sierra Club, 848 F.2d at 1083-84.
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thority. This presumption is based upon the rationale that it
is assumed the regulation was drafted upon a genuine con-
cern for the protection of federal lands, and not some invidi-
ous attempt to weaken state sovereignty. The statutory
requirements for administrative procedure must be assumed
to be sufficient to weed out arbitrary or thinly veiled efforts to
assault states in the rule making process.
This presumption, however, must be rebuttable. Thus, if
a federal regulation thwarts the use of an easement in a man-
ner perceived as deleterious to state interests while further-
ing only a minor federal benefit, then the regulation must
submit to the state's objection.
A state should be able to prevail over federal restrictions
on R.S. 2477 easement use if it can satisfy five separate con-
ditions. These conditions are as follows:
1. The state interest justifying the type of easement use
must be compelling, it cannot simply advance the "public
good."
2. The state interest must be one of a peculiarly unique
and local character.
3. There can be no viable alternative reasonably avail-
able to the state other than the type of use sought.
4. Any impact to the federal interests on surrounding fed-
eral lands through which the easement passes must be
merely incidental, not intentional.
5. Use of the easement, though inconsistent with the fed-
eral purposes for which the surrounding federal lands are
managed, does not significantly impair those federal pur-
poses. This standard, while protecting state interests, is
still consistent with "supremacy clause" analysis which
preempts state conduct if the action interferes with the ac-
complishment of federal purposes. Under traditional
supremacy tests, federal interests take precedence over
state concerns if the state's concerns prompt actions frus-
trating to federal goals. 113 However, in limited circum-
stances state conduct will be allowed. The standard
proffered here is intended to clarify those circumstances.
113. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
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First, the state interest being promoted by the right of
way development must be compelling. Within the meaning of
"compelling" the concepts of health and safety stand fore-
most. If a right of way is being improved because use or an
expected use of the current route is inherently dangerous,
then a state's assertion of a compelling interest will be more
persuasive. 114 Protection of a particularly fragile or criti-
cally valuable ecosystem may also be compelling. 1 5 Develop-
ment of a right of way for ensuring essential police and fire
protection, otherwise unavailable, can be a compelling pur-
pose. Public trust doctrine obligations, in addition to police
and fire protection, are fundamental state responsibilities, in-
capable of being abrogated, and therefore constitute compel-
ling interests. 1 6 Economic development interests seldom, if
ever, rise to the level of being considered compelling." 7
Second, the state interest asserted must be, due to a vari-
ety of local circumstances, characterized as unique; it cannot
stem from generic problems which generally afflict most
states to one degree or another. Thus, in a variety of differ-
ent types of cases, courts have found such localized oddities
as ocean currents and navigational hazards, seismic activity,
weather peculiarities, remoteness, particularly rugged topog-
raphy, and other similar contexts to justify special deference
to asserted state interests." 8 This requirement is necessary
to prevent states from impeding federal objectives in or-ler to
unfairly compete with other states under the guise of special
hardship. Therefore, the elements which contribute to a
unique, local character for a problem should be interpreted
conservatively, requiring a firm link between the claim as-
serted and specific,. detailed justifications.
Third, the development or improvement of an R.S. 2477
right of way, if inconsistent with the surrounding federal
lands management, must be necessary for the ability of the
state to achieve its compelling objectives. Mere efficacy is in-
114. Sierra Club, 848 F.2d 1068.
115. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148-51.
116. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
117. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 437 (2d ed. 1988).
118. See generally PLATER ET AL., supra note 94, at 477-536.
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/1
POTENTIAL LEGAL STANDARDS
sufficient to justify such action. It must be demonstrated
that there is no other viable alternative available which will
achieve the desired results. This criterion for the standard
advocated here is essential if the federal government is to
protect itself from ulterior motives other than the stated rea-
sons for the right of way improvement. For example, before
an R.S. 2477 route will be permitted to be used in a manner
inconsistent with the management goals for surrounding fed-
eral lands, there can be no avenue for access available under
the comprehensive array of other regulatory statutes. This
criterion may prove one the most difficult obstacles for a state
to negotiate around due to the mechanisms for access found
within the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act 1 9 and
the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act. 120 In
most situations, resorting to R.S. 2477 would be unnecessary
because of the permit procedures that already exist and cur-
rently address most state needs.
Fourth, the impacts to federal purposes must be inciden-
tal and unavoidable. There can be no evidence in the record
of the state employing R.S. 2477 with the express purpose of
frustrating federal plans. One example in which a court
would take especially careful scrutiny is where a route is
sought for development prior to anticipated federal initiatives
to place public domain into more restrictive management
classifications. A state cannot be allowed to cloak attempts to
vitiate federal land conservation programs under a veil of fic-
tional interests.
Fifth, the unavoidable impacts to federal purposes, if
negative, cannot be significant. "Significant" in this context
is defined as making it impossible for the federal purposes to
be achieved. Simply making the federal tasks more difficult,
or adding to administrative costs, is not significant. Simi-
larly, frustrating a preferred management choice when other
effective means in realizing a federal purpose are also avail-
able, does not constitute a significant impact. In addition,
"federal purposes" must not be frivolous nor arbitrary. In-
119. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1771 (1988).
120. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3170, 3171, 3210 (1988).
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stead, the federal purpose defended must be one that is cen-
tral to the management plan when viewed in its entirety.
Finally, current case law supports this five point stan-
dard that strikes a balance between state and federal inter-
ests under the property clause. Though the property clause
has received little attention compared its commerce clause
sibling, several generalizations can be relied upon.
What the courts have consistently made clear is that the
federal government controls property as both a sovereign and
as a proprietor. 121 The issue, then, is not one of questioning
the existence of federal power, but rather of clarifying its
scope and application. There are three types of land to which
the property clause may be applied: (a) lands in which the
federal government is the owner in fee simple and is the sole
holder of property interests,'122 (b) lands in which the federal
government retains fee title, but the lands are encumbered by
interests held by a state sovereign, 123 and (c) lands to which
the federal government holds no title, but upon which con-
duct (whether state or private) may frustrate management
goals on neighboring federal land.' 24
As to the first instance, courts have consistently ruled
that federal power to regulate and control is complete. The
Kleppe Court held that "[the] Property Clause, in broad
terms, gives Congress the power to determine what are need-
ful rules respecting the federal lands... [and] the power over
the public lands thus entrusted is without limitations." 25
Thus, it can reasonably be assumed that the federal govern-
ment is free to use such property as it sees fit, and regulate it
in any fashion which rationally relates to the goals sought, so
long as no other statutes or Constitutional restrictions are
violated.
121. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the 'Classic'Property Clause Theory, 63
N.C. L. REV. 617 (1985); Dale D. Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause
Doctrine, 63 DENV. U. L. REV. 495 (1986).
122. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 538-39 (1976).
123. See United States v. Volger, 859 F.2d 638, 640-42 (9th Cir. 1988).
124. Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249-51 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
125. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976).
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/1
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In the latter two situations, the court is not nearly so pre-
cise and definitive. A series of recent cases, however, does
illuminate some governing principles for extraterritorial ap-
plication of the property clause.126 Cases involving exercises
of federal regulatory power over conduct on state and private
lands should be upheld only when the conduct sought to be
restricted would significantly frustrate federal purposes on
federal lands.127
Such a standard would not be inconsistent with current
case law. The courts in Vogler, Brown, and Alexander all
cited the significance of threats in justifying the extra-territo-
rial application of the property clause. Vogler's caterpillar
march across sensitive lands in summer would cause damage
so severe, the court feared it would "require 100 years to re-
turn to their original condition."12 Because the duck hunt-
ing would occur in such close proximity to adjacent lands,
there was significant danger of injury to park users, accord-
ing to the Brown court.129 In Alexander the court relied on
Congressional findings that snow machine and motorboat use
"seriously marred" the character of the designated wilder-
ness. 13 0 "Significance" in all three cases can be interpreted in
the fashion set forth here. It would be impossible to preserve
the natural ecosystem of the Charlie River Wilderness if in-
numerable scars persisting over 100 years were allowed to be
formed; it would be impossible to manage an area for its pris-
tine character and solitude' 3' with the persistent drone of
motorized vehicles.
126. In addition to the four cases described within the text, see also Camfield
v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897); United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264
(1927); United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Moore, 640 F. Supp. 164 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).
127. Ronald F. Frank and John H. Eckhard, Power of Congress Under the
Property Clause to Give Extraterritorial Effect to Federal Lands Law: Will Re-
specting Property Go the Way of Affecting Commerce?, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW
663, 678 (1983).
128. United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 1988).
129. United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1977).
130. Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1251 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
131. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988).
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In all cases where the property clause was successfully
applied to property outside federal ownership, no contention
was made denying the significance of the threat. Indeed, this
is wise policy (to restrict extra-territorial application of the
clause) in order to prevent potential problems of "wide-rang-
ing displacement of traditional state land regulations." 132
Thus, under this standard, the regulation and conduct of
a state is beyond the extra-territorial reach of the federal
property clause if the regulation or conduct in question does
not render the attainment of federal purposes on federal land
impossible.
It is therefore appropriate that the standard in the sec-
ond situation (federal title but state easement) fall some-
where between the extreme of a free exercise of control
without limitation standard (federal land, no encumbrances)
and the relatively relaxed standard of significant impact (no
federal title) for conduct with effects that are inconsistent
with federal purposes for federal lands. Lands to which the
federal government retains title, but has granted special in-
terests - like easements - to state sovereigns, should not
be regulated by the same unfettered power of the Kleppe
standard as lands for which the federal government is sole
interest holder. At the same time, these lands, to which the
federal government retains title, should not be subject to all
state regulation and conduct save that which makes the at-
tainment of federal purposes impossible. That is why the
standard offered here was developed. It provides a midpoint
balance that restricts unilateral federal power, yet makes it
difficult, though not impossible, for states to arbitrarily im-
pair federal management goals. The proposed standard rec-
ognizes the peculiar status of these lands, created by R.S.
2477.
Conclusion
With the development of consistent and understandable
standards governing the existence and the scope of R.S. 2477
132. Joseph L. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation
of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REv. 239, 254 (1976).
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss2/1
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rights of way, predictability may return to land management
in the West and far North. Once these standards are under-
stood, both federal and state governments can conform their
management plans and goals in a fashion which will prevent
litigation and its attendant problems of delay, cost, demorali-
zation, and stymied long term investment. Until this prob-
lem is resolved, it will continue to frustrate more coordinated
and cooperative management of lands locked into the patch-
work of mixed federal and state ownership. As a consequence
of the current problem, optimal management strategies based
upon ecosystems rather than jurisdictions will not evolve.
Through the evolution of standards for R.S. 2477's applica-
tion, hopefully this significant impediment to proper lands
management will dissolve.
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